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Pews and Politics: The Effect of Theology on Attachment to the Democratic Party among 
Black Voters 
Introduction  
As the race for the Democratic presidential candidate continues, the candidates are 
paying special attention to the Black vote. Black voters were the deciding factor in the results of 
both the 2008 and 2016 Democratic primaries1 and their influence on the party is still strong. 
Before the 2020 South Carolina Democratic presidential primary, Joe Biden’s position in the 
race was uncertain due to his losses in the Iowa and New Hampshire primaries. However, after 
receiving an endorsement from South Carolina Representative Jim Clyburn, the highest-ranking 
Black congressman, Biden’s support among Black voters in the state skyrocketed and he beat 
Bernie Sanders in the state’s primary by a 28-point margin2. As Democratic candidates continue 
to compete for the Black vote, they must also consider an institution with a strong influence on 
Black political ideology and activism: The Black church. 
My research question asks how messages disseminated in Black churches have 
influenced the partisan attachment of Black voters. As an institution, the Black church has played 
a large role in Black Americans’ political history. Throughout history, the Black church has been 
 
1 Bradner, Eric, Gregory Krieg, and Dan Merica. “South Carolina Primary Results: 6 Takeaways.” CNN. Cable 
News Network, March 1, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/29/politics/super-tuesday-south-carolina-primary-
takeaways/index.html. 




more than a religious institution; it has been a site of social and political mobilization3. 
Politically, it has encouraged the political participation of Black voters by hosting elected 
officials and candidates, educating churchgoers on political issues, and offering opportunities for 
political participation, such as providing transportation to voting stations and encouraging voter 
registration among churchgoers4. Specifically, the Black church has been an important site of 
political organization for the Democratic Party, despite attempts from the Republican Party to 
appeal to Black Christian voters on moral issues5.  
The principal aim of this project is to measure the partisanship of Black voters, with an 
emphasis on Black conservatives. Conservatism is traditionally defined by adherence to and 
support of traditional values in concordance with opposition to radical change6. Since my 
research focuses on Black voters, I restrict my definition of conservatism to a brand of 
conservative ideology seen most among Black people: In addition to holding anti-government 
attitudes7, Black conservatives advocate strict adherence to religious and moral standards and 
support the idea of “self-help” and Black entrepreneurship rather than expansive welfare 
programs8. Although self-identification was my primary measurement of ideology in the study, I 
also used answers to specific questions as a measure of operational ideology to be compared to 
the symbolic ideology9 of the respondents.  
 
3 Harris-Lacewell, Melissa. "Righteous Politics: The Role of the Black Church in Contemporary Politics." Cross 
Currents 57, no. 2 (Summer, 2007): 193. 
4 Harris-Lacewell. “Righteous Politics”, 181-182. 
5 Harris-Lacewell. “Righteous Politics”, 180. 
6 O'Sullivan, Noël. "Conservatism." In The Oxford handbook of political ideologies. Oxford University Press (OUP), 
2013. 
7 Philpot, Tasha S. Conservative but Not Republican: The Paradox of Party Identification and Ideology among 
African Americans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018: 6. 
8 Lewis, Angela K. "Black conservatism in America." Journal of African American Studies 8, no. 4 (2005): 7. 
9  Symbolic ideology is defined as the ideological label that a person adopts. Operational ideology, on the other 
hand, is defined by a person’s actual opinions on political and social issues. 
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In my study, I differentiate between two theological trends common in Black churches: 
Black liberation theology and the prosperity gospel. Black liberation theology draws similarities 
between the plight of Jesus Christ and the plight of Black people in the United States (and across 
the world) and encourages Black political activism. This theological trend was common and 
influential during the Civil Rights Movement but has recently declined in popularity among 
Black churches. The prosperity gospel, on the other hand, emphasizes individuality and teaches 
followers that faithfulness and adherence to Christianity’s teachings will be rewarded with 
financial success10.  
In analyzing the effects that these messages have on Black political ideology and 
partisanship, I make the assumption that Black churchgoers, on average, are attending majority 
Black churches since many churches are still racially segregated. As an institution, the Black 
church has a unique connection to politics and voting among Black people, and it is this unique 
connection that drove me to study the effect that messages espoused in Black churches can have 
on partisan attachment.  
In order to study the relationship between religion and politics among Black voters, I 
used a multimethod approach. In addition to analyzing survey data from the 2016 Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study, I examined responses from a series of eight interviews conducted 
with Black voters throughout the Triangle area of various church affiliations. I find that 
adherence to Black liberation theology does predict an increase in party attachment among all 
Black voters while adhering to the prosperity gospel predicts a decrease in party attachment only 
 
10 Harris-Lacewell. “Righteous Politics”, 186-187. 
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among conservatives. Finally, being a woman predicts a strengthened attachment to the 
Democratic Party, and this effect is stronger among conservatives. 
Literature Review 
My study relies on the notion that Black public opinion is formed through social 
interactions. This is to challenge certain political theories that overstate the importance of elites 
in forming public opinion11. Although social interactions and elites may dually affect the 
formation of public opinion, my research emphasizes the role that the Black church has in 
influencing and reinforcing Black opinion. Furthermore, my study is predicated on a clear 
distinction between partisanship12 and political ideology13. In his book14, Corey Fields notes that 
there are even ideological distinctions within Black Republicans, making the assumption of 
ideological diversity within Black Democrats more plausible. Despite the party’s appeal to 
liberal voters, conservative Black voters may still consistently vote for the Democratic Party and 
self-identify as Democrats.  
The Black Church 
It is important to acknowledge which political institutions are influential in shaping Black 
political opinion. In previous research, the Black church has been shown to be important in 
informing Black public opinion. In studying this relationship between Black churches and 
 
11 Druckman, James N., Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus. “How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion 
Formation.” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 57–79. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000500. 
12 I will define partisanship as, in the context of a two-party system, an affinity towards one party over another. 
13 I will be using Denzau’s definition of ideology as “the shared framework of mental models that groups of 
individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that 
environment should be structured” (4). 
14 Fields, Corey. Black Elephants in the Room: The Surprising Politics of African American Republicans. Place of 
publication not identified: Univ Of California Press, 2017: 
Lofton 7 
 
political opinion, some scholars differentiate between “political churches”15 and non-political 
churches. They find that although church attendance is not correlated with higher politicization 
of Black voters, going to a political church has a positive influence in inspiring political 
mobilization16. Ultimately, when the messages of Black churches are political, they can inspire 
mobilization, pointing to the power that the Black church holds as a political institution. 
However, it is possible that the aforementioned decline in church attendance among Black 
people has decreased the influence that the church has on Black voters. In addition, Black 
churches differ by more than their political messages, or lack thereof, and there is little research 
on the effects that different denominations can have on Black public opinion.   
When researching the influence of Black religiosity on political ideology, other scholars 
choose to differentiate these churches based on the messages that they preach. Three common 
theologies that scholars study are the social gospel17, the prosperity gospel, and Black liberation 
theology. While the messages of both the social gospel and Black liberation theology inspire 
feelings of race and class solidarity, it has been found that Black liberation theology is influential 
in inspiring progressive ideals beyond the Civil Rights Movement, such as Black feminism18. 
Moreover, the prosperity gospel has been connected with higher levels of conservatism, 
specifically racial conservatism, among Black people19.  
In addition to these theologies, some scholars have identified mega-churches as having a 
unique influence on political ideology. Black people are attending “mega-churches” and 
 
15 She defines political churches as those in which collective action is encouraged through the distribution of 
political messages during services. She measures this by asking if the respondent heard political announcements 
during the service. 
16 Calhoun-Brown, Allison. “African American Churches and Political Mobilization: The Psychological Impact of 
Organizational Resources.” The Journal of Politics 58, no. 4 (1996): 951. https://doi.org/10.2307/2960144. 
17 This message is about continuing the legacy of the Civil Rights Movement. 
18 McDaniel et al. “The Faith of Black Politics”, 274. 
19 McDaniel et al. “The Faith of Black Politics”, 258. 
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churches of denominations not considered “mainline black denominations”20 in larger numbers21. 
Scholars posit that these mega-churches are much more likely to preach the prosperity gospel 
than Black liberation theology and that this shift in the messages of Black churches could 
weaken the Democratic Party’s hold on Black voters and offer Republican candidates a chance to 
appeal to Black voters on social issues22. These early predictions do not coincide with the reality 
of the Black vote in the 2008, 2012, and 2016 presidential elections, which still saw an 
overwhelming majority of Black voters voting for the Democratic Party. Despite their faulty 
predictions, these studies are informative in thinking about the changing role of the Black church 
as a political institution and its role in the formation of Black political ideology. While these 
studies do offer complex analyses, they do not touch on the ideological differences between 
Black Republicans and Black Democrats. 
Black Republicans vs. Black Conservatives 
 In examining Black Republicans and Black conservatives, scholars often wonder what 
the defining factors of the groups are and what differentiates them from each other. That is, what 
determines whether a Black conservative will identify as a Democrat, Republican, or 
Independent. For the purpose of this study, Black conservatism is defined by "anti-government 
attitudes” and “religiosity and support for traditional family values”23. Many scholars argue that 
levels of group consciousness influence partisan identification among Black voters. Group 
consciousness is defined as a sense of identity with a group in addition to an “awareness that 
 
20 Harris-Lacewell identifies the Baptist, Methodist, and African Methodist Episcopal Church as the traditional 
Black denominations. 
21 Harris-Lacewell. “Righteous Politics”, 182. 
22 Harris-Lacewell. “Righteous Politics”, 186-188. 
23 Philpot. Conservative but Not Republican, 6. 
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group membership has political implications”24. In her book on Black conservatives, Tasha 
Philpot finds that when group consciousness is low, it is less likely that a Black voter with a 
conservative ideology will identify as a Democrat. On the other hand, when group consciousness 
is high, Black voters will vote for the Democratic Party even if they self-identify as conservative 
and hold conservative political opinions. It is worth noting that she finds that Black voters with 
low levels of group consciousness are still more likely to identify as Independents than as 
Republicans25. 
In her 2018 book, Conservative but Not Republican: The Paradox of Party Identification 
and Ideology among African Americans, Philpot uses two election studies26, a content analysis of 
two newspapers27, and qualitative interviews with voters across all demographics28. Her book 
makes an important contribution to the concept of ideology; she does not use the unidimensional 
liberal-conservative continuum when measuring ideology, rather she expands the liberal-
conservative continuum to six dimensions: laissez-faire, racial, military, social welfare, religious, 
and moral. She explains that when asked whether they are liberal or conservative, people use 
their placement as liberal or conservative on each of these dimensions and the respective weight 
that they place on these dimensions to self-identify as liberal or conservative29.  
Furthermore, she asserts that Black people have conceived of the terms “liberal” and 
“conservative” in a distinct way that draws from their historical and contemporary experiences in 
the United States30. Certain issues, such as affirmative action, are explicitly racial issues; 
 
24 Philpot. Conservative but Not Republican, 132. 
25 Philpot, Conservative but Not Republican, 182. 
26 Philpot uses the 2012 Religious Worldview Study and the 2010 Post-Midterm Election Study. 
27 Philpot conducted a content analysis of 1,600 articles from the New York Times over a 150-year period and 679 
articles from the New York Amsterdam News over an 80-year period. 
28 Philpot. Conservative but Not Republican, 207. 




however, a host of other issues, such as education and welfare, have become implicitly racial31. 
In contrast to other voters whose racial identities are not intertwined in the state’s political 
history, Black voters think through political issues in the context of their own lives and the 
history of the Black experience in the United States when they identify themselves as liberal or 
conservative. 
Philpot’s study design is akin to the way in which I conducted my study. I find that her 
use of both interviews and survey data analysis offers a comprehensive view of Black political 
ideology and partisanship and the ways in which they differ among Black voters. While the 
survey data offers generalizable information, the interviews give the reader a more complex 
account of the different factors that go into the formation of Black political ideology.  
Other scholars have pointed to the prevalence of respectability politics as a trait that is 
consistent among Black Republicans. Respectability politics assumes that “marginalized classes 
will receive their share of political influence and social standing not because democratic values 
and law require it but because they demonstrate their compatibility with the ‘mainstream’ or non-
marginalized class”32. Challenging scholars who point to group consciousness as the determining 
factor of Black partisanship, these scholars argue that Black Republicans “are deeply committed 
to black identity”33 and find that Black Republicans exhibit high levels of racial identification34.  
In his ethnography on Black Republicans, Corey Fields finds that there is a difference, 
however, in whether Black Republicans are “color-blind” or “race-conscious”. Color-blind 
 
31 Philpot, Conservative but Not Republican, 52. 




34 Fields. Black Elephants in the Room, 202. 
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Republicans still conceive of themselves as belonging to the Black community, but do not see 
identity politics as a way towards equality. Race-conscious Black Republicans, on the other 
hand, center race in their personal and political lives, and believe that Republican policies are 
beneficial to the Black community. Interestingly, he notes that color-blind Black Republicans are 
the ones most often in the public eye because their ideology is more likely to gain them 
acceptance among their white counterparts in the Republican Party35. 
His study finds that respectability politics plays an important role in how both color-blind 
and race-conscious Black Republicans conceive of other Black people. Race-conscious Black 
Republicans, on the one hand, point to and uplift the “respectable” Black person in justifications 
for calls for racial equality. Color-blind Black Republicans, on the other hand, employ “an 
inverse politics of respectability”: they criticize and blame Black people for not being 
respectable enough36. Though respectability politics is prevalent among Black Republicans, it is 
doubtful that this is a trait that exists solely among this demographic. Furthermore, these claims 
are disputed by quantitative evidence that shows statistically significant low levels of group 
consciousness among Black Republicans. It is possible that scholars with competing 
explanations are not using the same definition of group consciousness, which could contribute to 
the difference in results. 
Black Liberation Theology and The Prosperity Gospel 
 Black liberation theology organizes37 itself around the “Black experience” in the United 
States. Founded by James Cone in the 1960s during the height of the Civil Rights Movement and 
 
35 Fields. Black Elephants in the Room, 28-30. 
36 Fields. Black Elephants in the Room, 208-209. 
37 Sneed, “Black Liberation Theology”, 10. 
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the Black Power Movement38, this theology drove people to demand change through the Civil 
Rights Movement. Though Black liberation theology reached the height of its popularity during 
this time, there is a long history of Black religious leaders placing the Black experience within 
the scope of Christianity39. The movement advocating a Black theology of liberation served as a 
response to claims that Black religion was just a “folk religion” concerned more with the 
emancipation of Black people than religion itself40. Black liberation theology asserts that rather 
than separating their Blackness from their Christianity, Black Christians must incorporate their 
Blackness into their Christianity. Cone placed white supremacy (and white Christianity) in direct 
opposition to Black Christianity and Black religious expression; he believed that “white 
supremacy had poisoned white Christianity” and, as a result, white Christianity could offer no 
respite for the poor and oppressed41.  
Throughout history, Black people have struggled against the forces of white supremacy. 
In an attempt to reconcile the reality of slavery, Jim Crow laws, and continued discrimination 
against Black people with the existence of God, Black liberation theology depicts God as a figure 
who stands with the oppressed and downtrodden in society42. Black liberation theology promises 
that salvation will come in the form of liberation from economic and social oppression43. 
Because this theology recognizes the systemic nature of racism, it does not place the burden of 
 
38 Hagerty, Barbara Bradley. “Black Liberation Theology, in Its Founder's Words.” NPR. NPR, March 31, 2008. 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89236116. 
39 McDaniel et al, “Faith of Black Politics”, 263 
40 Joseph R. Washington, Jr., Black Religion: The Negro and Christianity in the United States (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1984) p. vii. 
41 Sneed, “Black Liberation Theology”, 1. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Sneed, “Black Liberation Theology”, 15. 
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righteousness on Black Christians. Followers do not need to strictly adhere to the Bible; instead, 
Black Christians have a duty to fight white supremacy and “empower themselves”44.  
 The prosperity gospel, on the other hand, argues that it is the duty of Christians to remain 
faithful to the church and the word of God and that this faithfulness will be rewarded with 
financial prosperity and good health. Some believers and proponents of this theology further this 
message to argue that God punishes the lack of faith and sin with poverty and bad health45. The 
prosperity gospel has its roots in the Evangelical Protestantism movements of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, which placed an emphasis on “born-again experiences… and biblical 
authority”46, and the televangelical movements of the 1980s.  
The prosperity gospel emphasizes the financial and religious responsibility of the 
individual and deemphasizes the role of the government and the state, especially in response to 
social and political issues47. Its stress on faithfulness and individualism make it a conservative 
theology. Creflo Dollar, a well-known Black televangelist whose congregation numbers around 
30,000 each week, infamously asserted that strong faith was the only way to fight racism48. In 
addition to encouraging strong religious faith, the prosperity gospel encourages its adherents to 
tithe regularly to their churches and promises that tithing will be rewarded with wealth49.  
 The prosperity gospel has experienced a rise in support among Black people50. In 
addition, studies have found that Black people are the racial group most likely to adhere to the 
 
44 McDaniel et al., “Faith of Black Politics”, 263. 
45 Koch, Bradley A. “The Prosperity Gospel and Economic Prosperity: Race, Class, Giving, and Voting.” PhD diss., 
Indiana University, 2009, pg. 1. 
46 Koch, “The Prosperity Gospel and Economic Prosperity”, 2. 
47 Koch, “The Prosperity Gospel and Economic Prosperity”, 32. 
48 McDaniel et al., “Faith of Black Politics”, 263. 
49 Koch, “The Prosperity Gospel and Economic Prosperity”, 25. 
50 McDaniel et al., “Faith of Black Politics”, 262. 
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messages of the prosperity gospel; in his dissertation, Koch speculates that the messages 
espoused through the prosperity gospel could appeal to Black people because of the 
socioeconomic limitations that they face51. Among Black voters, Koch also finds that adherence 
to the prosperity gospel increased one’s chances of voting for Bush in 2004 and identifying as 
Republican, although the likelihood of both occurrences was still very low52. 
Hypotheses and Variables 
Do the underlying messages disseminated during church services influence the political 
behavior of Black voters? Belief in Black liberation theology is associated with higher levels of 
belief in Black linked fate, Black empowerment, and racial and class solidarity53. Through its 
encouragement of solidarity, attending a church that espouses Black liberation theology will 
influence Black religious voters to view themselves and their lives as linked to the lives of other 
Black people. Because the Democratic Party is seen as the party for Black people, hearing 
messages that emphasize the tenets of Black liberation theology will strengthen attachment to the 
Democratic Party.  Because the prosperity gospel strongly encourages individualism and 
faithfulness, churches that espouse the messages of this theology strengthen conservative beliefs 
and discourage seeking help from the government; therefore, Black voters who attend these 
churches may see the Democratic Party as being out of line with their own beliefs and will have 
weaker attachments to the party.  
Though these theologies can influence partisan attachment among all Black voters, I 
believe that Black conservatives are the most susceptible to church messages due to the high 
 
51 Koch, “The Prosperity Gospel and Economic Prosperity”, 47. 
52 Koch, “The Prosperity Gospel and Economic Prosperity”, 76; 78. 
53 McDaniel et al., “Faith of Black Politics”, 273. 
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value they place on religion. Furthermore, as the Democratic Party’s platform has become more 
progressive on non-race-based issues, Black conservatives may be the group most likely to feel 
disenchanted by this change. Their conservative beliefs may place them in a position where they 
are more ideologically aligned with the Republican Party but remain tied to the Democratic Party 
because of the historical relationships between the two parties and Black voters in the United 
States.  
I hypothesize that the influence of church attendance on partisanship will be dependent 
on the type of messages espoused in the churches that Black voters attend: attending churches 
whose messages are in line with Black liberation theology will reinforce identification with the 
Democratic Party while attending churches whose messages are in line with the prosperity 
gospel will weaken identification with the Democratic Party. In forwarding this hypothesis, I 
argue that it is churches and religion that influence partisan attachment and not vice versa.  
H0: The type of church that one attends has no effect on attachment to the Democratic 
Party among Black voters. 
H1: Attendance at churches that adhere to Black liberation theology will strengthen 
attachment to the Democratic Party among Black voters. 
H2: Attendance at churches that adhere to the prosperity gospel will weaken attachment 
to the Democratic Party among Black voters. 
H3: The effect of church theology on attachment to the Democratic Party will be stronger 
for Black conservatives than Black non-conservatives. 
My primary independent variable was church theology. Though my primary dependent 
variable was partisanship, I also observed the effect that church theology and denomination have 
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on political ideology. With my study, I aim to analyze and explain what influences party 
attachment among Black conservatives.  
Methodology 
I used both quantitative and qualitative methods in my study. The first part of my analysis 
came from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). The second portion of my 
data came from interviews of church leaders and churchgoers in the Triangle Area (Raleigh, 
Durham, and Chapel Hill) of North Carolina.  
Survey Data 
The CCES is a survey done by YouGov every year beginning in 2006 and is distributed 
to over 50,000 people. In election years, the survey is distributed in two waves: the pre-election 
wave of the survey asks more general ideological and demographic questions while the post-
election wave of the survey asks questions more specific to the election that just occurred. In 
non-election years, there is just one wave of the survey54. For the quantitative portion of the 
study, I used CCES data from 2016. In addition to the large sample of Black respondents55, the 
CCES is especially helpful because it asks respondents in depth questions about their religion, 
religiosity, and denomination. 
 In order to observe the effect of Black liberation theology and the prosperity gospel on 
the partisan attachment of Black voters, I observed the denominations in which these theologies 
are most prominent, though this was not a perfect measure. Adherence to Black liberation 
theology was measured by membership in the following denominations: African Methodist 
 
54 "CCES." CCES. Accessed September 25, 2019. https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/. 
55 The 2016 CCES contained 7,926 respondents who identified as Black. 
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Episcopal Church, National Baptist Convention, and Church of God in Christ56. On the other 
hand, adherence to the prosperity gospel was measured by membership in the following 
denominations: Pentecostal and Holiness57.  
The CCES also measured partisanship on both a 7-point and 3-point scale and measured 
ideology on both a 5-point and 7-point scale. Specifically, the 7-point partisanship scale was 
integral in developing a continuous measure of partisan attachment. In addition, I analyzed the 
following variables from the CCES: gender, education, geography, vote choice in the 
presidential election and state elections, and issue opinions (gay marriage, healthcare, and taxes). 
The quantitative portion of my study allowed me to control for gender and other factors that may 
shape the partisan attachment of Black voters. Furthermore, I was able to make a more 
generalizable analysis on the effect of denomination on partisanship and ideology among Black 
respondents. 
Interviews 
 The second portion of my analysis was qualitative in nature: I conducted eight interviews 
with church leaders and churchgoers in the Triangle area. I recruited interview respondents for 
my study both by emailing various churches in the area and through mutual personal 
connections. Some of my interviews were voice recorded, but the identity of the people in those 
interviews remain anonymous. In my thesis, they are referred to by letters that have no relation to 
their actual identity (e.g. Respondent M). Additionally, the respondents signed a consent form 
before their interview in accordance with IRB regulations. Participation was completely 
 
56 Sneed, Roger A. “Black Liberation Theology, Black Cultural Criticism and the Problem of Homosexuality.” PhD 
diss., Vanderbilt University, 2006: 27. 
57 Koch, Bradley A. “The Prosperity Gospel and Economic Prosperity: Race, Class, Giving, and Voting.” PhD diss., 
Indiana University, 2009: 17. 
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voluntary, and respondents were not compensated in any way for completing the interview. The 
interviews took between twenty and forty minutes and had a total of thirty-two questions.  
The first portion of the interview had a couple of basic demographic questions pertaining 
to age and the city and state of residence. The next portion of the interview asked respondents to 
describe their stance on a series of issues as conservative, moderate, or liberal. The purpose of 
this section was to get a measure of their ideological stance on a series of issues so that when 
they self-reported their ideology later in the interview, I would be able to gauge which of the 
policy dimensions were most relevant in their conception of ideology. Their responses to these 
issues were coded from 1(conservative) to 3 (liberal). Using the responses from this section, I 
took the mean of each of these scores to develop a composite score for operational ideology.  
 The next few portions of the interview allowed for open-ended responses. The third 
portion of the interview asked respondents straightforward questions on religion, partisan 
identification, and their ideology. Respondents were asked about their denomination, how often 
they attend church services (both in person and online), how often they read the Bible, and how 
long they have been attending their current church. In addition, they were asked about their 
partisan identification, whether they voted in the last election, and whether they self-identify as 
liberal or conservative. The purpose of this section was to compile information directly related to 
the respondent’s religiosity, partisan identification, and symbolic ideology. The question about 
the respondents’ ideology is last in this section to minimize the effect that the previous section 
would have on their answer. Additionally, in this section I prompted respondents with a 
Prosperity Index58, which measures someone’s adherence to the tenets of the prosperity gospel.  
 
58 Koch, “The Prosperity Gospel and Economic Prosperity”, 70. 
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The fourth portion asked the respondents to vote between two hypothetical candidates. The 
candidates were described as such: 
Candidate A: Pro-choice, supports the Affordable Care Act, supports same-sex marriage 
Candidate B: Pro-life, supports Affordable Care Act, supports same-sex marriage 
I asked the respondents to tell me for which candidate they would vote and their reason 
for voting for them. After they responded to this question, I presented them with the information 
that Candidate A is a Democrat and Candidate B is a Republican. Afterward, I asked them if they 
would like to change their vote and why. The purpose of this section was to measure the relative 
saliency of ideology, issue preferences, and partisanship in determining vote choice. 
Hypothetically, someone who is conservative would be more likely to vote for Candidate B; 
however, a strong attachment to the Democratic Party could cause them to change their vote 
choice once they are told to which party each candidate belongs. This section was placed directly 
after the question asking respondents to self-report their ideology so that they would have their 
ideology in mind when deciding on a candidate.  
The fifth and final portion of the interview consisted of open-ended questions about 
religion, partisanship, and political ideology. These questions touched on the following topics: 
what it means to be conservative or liberal, what role religion plays in the formation of their 
political opinion and voting behavior, and their opinions on their respective party affiliations.  
The purpose of this section was to gain a more sophisticated look into the respondents’ 
ideology and how they personally thought of it. Through my analysis of the CCES and the 
interviews, I could conduct a comprehensive analysis of the effect(s) that church theology and 




 For both studies, it is important to note that I am not comparing Black liberation theology 
to the prosperity gospel. Rather, I hypothesize that both theologies influence partisan attachment 
independent of each other. In my initial results, I find that attending a church known to preach 
Black liberation theology predicts a stronger attachment to the Democratic Party among all 
Black voters and non-conservatives. On the other hand, attending a church known to preach the 
prosperity gospel predicts a weaker attachment to the Democratic Party among Black 
conservatives.  
Survey Data- Measurements and Coding 
 Partisan attachment, originally coded on a 7-point scale, was coded on a continuous 0-1 
scale for the purpose of analysis. A score of 0 represents strong attachment to the Republican 
Party while a score of 1 represents strong attachment to the Democratic Party. By making a score 
of 1 representative of the strongest level of attachment to the Democratic Party, I could measure 
attachment to the party on a continuous scale. Similarly, ideology was coded on a 0-1 scale based 
on the original 5-point scale that ranges from “Very conservative” to “Very liberal”. Gender was 
coded as a dummy variable for women. The variable for education ranges from 0-5, with 0 
representing the lack of completion of a high school education and 5 representing a post-graduate 
degree. Church attendance is also coded from 0-5, with 0 representing someone who never goes 
to church and 5 representing someone who goes to church more than once a week. Both 




In addition to a measure of symbolic ideology, I used survey responses to questions on 
gay marriage, healthcare, and taxes to create a measure of operational ideology ranging from 0 to 
1. Unlike the measure of symbolic ideology, in which a score of 1 indicates strong liberalism, a 
score of 1 on the measure of operational ideology indicates strong conservatism59. Although I do 
not include the operational ideology variable in any of my regression models, I compare the 
descriptive statistics of this variable to those of the symbolic ideology variable. Additionally, I 
used measures of presidential vote choice, state senate vote choice, and state legislature vote 
choice. Each of these variables carry a value of either 0 or 1, with 0 indicating a vote for the 
Republican candidate and 1 indicating a vote for the Democratic candidate. I included these 
variables in order to analyze the correlations between electoral vote choices and party 
attachment. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1: Theology Adherence and Party Attachment Cross-Tabulations 
















































Note. See full table in Appendix. N= 7664. There are 509 Black liberation theology adherents. Black liberation theology 
adherents are identified by the following denominations: National Baptist Convention, African Methodist Episcopal Church, and 
Church of God in Christ. There are 395 Prosperity Gospel adherents. Prosperity gospel adherents are identified by the following 
 
59 The measure of operational ideology is coded in the opposite direction of symbolic ideology due to the way in 
which the tax variable is coded. 
Lofton 22 
 
denominations: Pentecostal and Holiness. The title “Non-Democrat” includes those with the following partisan attachments: 
Strong Republican, Lean Republican, Not very strong Republican, and Independent. 
 
 Table 1 shows that both Black liberation theology and prosperity gospel adherents are 
skewed towards strong attachment to the Democratic Party. However, prosperity gospel 
adherents constitute a higher percentage, relative to Black liberation theology adherents, of those 
respondents who are either strong Republicans, lean Republican, are Independents, or lean 
Democrat. In comparison, Black liberation theology adherents constitute a higher percentage of 
those respondents who are either not very strong Democrats or strong Democrats. While no 
significant conclusions can be drawn from the results of these cross-tabulations, we can still see 
that adherents of Black liberation theology are more likely than prosperity gospel adherents to 
have a strong attachment to the Democratic Party. Interestingly, while prosperity gospel 
adherents are more likely than Black liberation theology adherents to have attachments to the 
Republican Party or no attachment to either party, they are also more likely to lean Democrat. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics Across Ideological Groupings 
 All Conservatives Non-conservatives 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 






























































Note. Number of respondents in parentheses. The measure of operational ideology is the inverse of the symbolic ideology 
measurement, which ranges from 0 (conservative) to 3 (liberal). Full accounts of all summary statistics are available in the 
Appendix. 
 Table 2 shows that attachment to the Democratic Party, though still strong, is weaker 
among conservative respondents. This finding offers some preliminary support to my third 
hypothesis: conservatives may be more susceptible to the effects of religious theologies on their 
attachment to the Democratic Party since that attachment is not as secure as that of non-
conservatives. Lastly, I will bring attention to the fact that in the datasets containing all 
respondents and only conservatives, both Black liberation theology and prosperity adherents 
constitute 5-6% of the respondents. However, among non-conservatives, Black liberation 
theology adherents constitute 7% of the respondents while prosperity gospel adherents constitute 
4% of the respondents. The prosperity gospel is a conservative ideology, and Table 2 shows that 





















Table 3: Theology x Party Attachment 
 
 Party Attachment 








0.051*** 0.022 0.047*** 
 (0.011) (0.036) (0.011) 
Prosperity Gospel (0-1) -0.014 -0.064* 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.035) (0.014) 
Female = 1 0.052*** 0.125*** 0.043*** 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) 
Church Attendance 0.002 0.002 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) 
Education -0.001 -0.023*** 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
Intercept 0.779*** 0.720*** 0.795*** 
 (0.008) (0.025) (0.008) 
N 7545 1379 5535 
R-squared 0.014 0.043 0.017 
Adj. R-squared 0.014 0.039 0.016 
 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
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Note. Black liberation theology adherents are identified by the following denominations: National Baptist Convention, African 
Methodist Episcopal Church, and Church of God in Christ. Prosperity gospel adherents are identified by the following 
denominations: Pentecostal and Holiness. This regression was completed using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. 
  
 Table 3 includes three of the most important models from the multiple regressions that 
were run60. The first model includes all the Black respondents, the second model includes 
conservative Black respondents, and the third model includes non-conservative61 Black 
respondents. The first model shows that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
attending a church that is likely to espouse Black liberation theology and attachment to the 
Democratic Party. Specifically, adhering to Black liberation theology predicts a 5% increase in 
one’s attachment to the Democratic Party. This finding supports my first hypothesis: adherence 
to Black liberation theology will strengthen attachment to the Democratic Party. Furthermore, 
the relationship between gender and partisan attachment is significant: similar to the effect of 
Black liberation theology, being a woman predicts a 5% increase in one’s attachment to the 
Democratic Party. In the first model, gender is the only control variable with a statistically 
significant relationship to Democratic Party attachment. This model also reveals that although 
there is a negative relationship between adherence to the prosperity gospel and attachment to the 
Democratic Party, this relationship is not statistically significant, offering no support for my 
second hypothesis. 
The second model in Table 3 shows that among conservatives, the relationship between 
the Black liberation theology variable and attachment to the Democratic Party, though positive, 
is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the prosperity gospel variable and attachment to the Democratic Party: adhering to the 
 
60 More detailed versions of the regressions can be found in the Appendix. 
61 Those respondents who identified themselves as moderate, liberal, or very liberal on the 2016 CCES survey. 
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prosperity gospel predicts an almost 7% decrease in one’s attachment to the Democratic Party. 
The findings presented in this second model offer partial support for my second and third 
hypotheses: adherence to the prosperity gospel will weaken attachment to the Democratic Party 
and the effect of church theology on partisan attachment will be stronger among Black 
conservatives. Among all Black respondents, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between adherence to the prosperity gospel and attachment to the Democratic Party; however, 
among conservatives, this relationship becomes stronger and statistically significant. Conversely, 
the relationship between adherence to Black liberation theology is statistically significant among 
all respondents but statistically insignificant among conservatives. 
It is also worth noting the differences in the coefficients of other control variables among 
conservatives. Rather than the 5% increase observed among all Black respondents, being a 
woman predicts an almost 13% increase in attachment to the Democratic Party among 
conservatives. Political observers have noted that Black women are one of the most reliable 
voting blocs for the Democratic Party62, and this result shows that when Black voters are 
politically conflicted (being a conservative in a liberal party), being a woman may reinforce 
one’s attachment to the Democratic Party. Furthermore, there is a significant negative 
relationship among Black conservatives between education and attachment to the Democratic 
Party. This trend may result from the increased political knowledge that comes with education: 
as Black conservatives become more educated, they recognize how their beliefs do not align with 
the Democratic Party. 
 
62 Perry, Andre M., and David Harshbarger. “Why the Race for Black Voters Is the Most Important Democratic 





 The third model exhibits a significant relationship between adherence to Black liberation 
theology and attachment to the Democratic Party: adhering to Black liberation theology predicts 
an almost 5% increase in attachment to the Democratic Party among non-conservatives. On the 
other hand, there is a positive but statistically insignificant relationship between adherence to the 
prosperity gospel and attachment to the Democratic Party. Like the previous two models, the 
third model reveals that among non-conservatives there is a significant positive relationship 
between being a woman and attachment to the Democratic Party. Unlike the previous two 
models, the third model demonstrates that there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between church attendance and attachment to the Democratic Party among non-conservatives. 
Although the only significant relationship was found among non-conservative Black 
respondents, it is still indicative of the supportive role of Black churches for the Democratic 
Party. 
Figure 1: Gender, Prosperity Gospel Adherence, and Party Attachment 
 





 Stemming from the significant relationship observed between gender and party 
attachment, I was interested in analyzing whether gender had a distinct effect on the relationship 
between theology and party attachment. To observe this relationship, I constructed predicted 
value plots that replicate each of the three models presented earlier63. From these plots, I find that 
women exhibit stronger party attachment than men regardless of their ideology. Figure 1 exhibits 
that the prosperity gospel has a slightly stronger negative effect on party attachment for women 
compared to men. In addition, Figure 2 shows that among non-conservatives, the prosperity 
gospel has a stronger positive effect on party attachment for men compared to women. 
 From my quantitative analysis of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, I 
can reject the null hypothesis and offer partial support for all three of my hypotheses. I find that 
among all Black respondents and non-conservative Black respondents, belonging to a 
denomination associated with Black liberation theology predicts an increase in party attachment. 
Furthermore, among conservatives, belonging to a denomination associated with the prosperity 
 
63 The other predicted value plots can be found in the Appendix. 
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gospel predicts a decrease in party attachment. Finally, being a woman predicts stronger party 
attachment among all ideological groups. 
Interviews 
One of the main goals of conducting interviews was to obtain more complex descriptions 
of how people conceive of the relationship between their religion and their politics. Another 
important goal of these interviews was to observe how people felt about the parties with which 
they associated. Through the interviews, I was able to collect data on the relationships between 
the ideology, partisanship, and religion of my interviewees. My findings, though limited by the 
number of interviews, paint a complex picture of the relationships between these variables. 
These interviews function as a supplement rather than a complement to the survey data. Because 
of the small sample size, the results of these interviews cannot be generalized in the national or 
regional sense; however, their contents can still be used to parse out some of the complex ways 
in which people think about their religious and political beliefs and the connection between the 
two.  
 I conducted eight interviews with religiously/spiritually affiliated people in the Triangle 
region. I begin this discussion of results by giving a brief overview of the religious and political 
orientations of each interviewee and then move to a broader discussion of themes that emerged 
from the interviews. In talking about the results of these interviews, I compare responses 
between each of the respondents in addition to making large comparisons between all the 




Respondent A is a 20-year-old woman who currently lives in Carrboro, North Carolina. 
She is a Baptist Christian that attends her home church once a week when she is not at school 
and reads the Bible once a day. She considers herself a liberal Democrat and believes that the 
party is where they should be concerning social issues but wishes that some party members were 
not as adamant about pushing for universal healthcare because this policy goal may be 
unattainable and could harm their electoral chances. For Respondent A, religion does not play a 
large role in her political decisions. 
Respondent B is a 20-year-old woman who currently lives in Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina. She is a Baptist Christian that attends her local church about twice a month. She does 
not read the Bible anymore but still considers herself well-informed on its contents since she 
read it often as a child. She considers herself liberal and identifies as an Independent that 
consistently votes for Democratic candidates. She criticized the Democratic Party for being 
largely funded by billionaires and allowing that funding to determine what issues they address. 
She wishes that the Democratic Party would move to the left in terms of their policy positions 
and stated that the party has not taken up issues such as the school-to-prison pipeline, 
homelessness, and recidivism as much as they have issues like gun rights and abortion. When 
asked what role religion plays in her politics, she stated that she believes that the Bible is about 
love and likes candidates who embody that attitude. 
Respondent C is a 57-year-old man who currently lives in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. 
He is a Protestant Methodist and is a pastor at a local AME church. He considers himself a 
moderate Democrat but does not believe that the Democratic Party is operating in his best 
interest. Unlike other respondents, he used the term “we” when describing the Democratic Party. 
His use of that term signaled to me that although he had criticisms, he still strongly considered 
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himself a part of the party. He believes that the Democratic Party compromises so much that they 
end up losing too much and in the context of the Trump administration, have lowered their 
standards in terms of decorum and debate. Additionally, he wishes that Democrats would adopt 
stronger argument techniques instead of falling victim to the logically fallacious attacks of the 
Trump Administration and other Republicans. When asked what role religion plays in his 
politics, Respondent C stated that religion serves as his moral compass and emphasized the 
communal aspect of Christianity and how that influences him to be more compassionate and 
empathetic to his neighbors and to support policies that benefit all instead of just those with 
whom he personally identifies. 
Respondent D is a 50-year-old man who currently lives in Durham, North Carolina. 
Although he has formally left the Christian church, he still reads the Bible every day and 
considers himself spiritual. He sees himself as moderate and is registered to the Democratic 
Party but stated that his ideals align more with the Republican Party. Furthermore, he stated that 
while he does not believe the Democratic Party is operating in his best interest, “no party is ever 
operating in the best interest of Black people”64. Specifically, he criticized the Democratic Party 
for allowing Bernie Sanders to run with the party as a candidate even though he is not registered 
to the party. Moreover, he criticized how progress is halted at the government level due to how 
we have separated ourselves along partisan lines. When asked about how his religious beliefs 
influence his politics, Respondent D explained that there is always conflict between God’s law 
and man’s interpretation of it. He gave the example of same-sex marriage and how, according to 
his beliefs and his interpretation of religious texts, same-sex relationships are unnatural. His 
political orientation on this specific issue is compelling when compared to his more liberal 
 
64 Interview by Cameren Lofton, Durham, North Carolina, February 10, 2020. 
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orientation on other social issues, especially abortion rights. According to Respondent D, “it is 
not his place to tell a woman what to do with her body”.65 
 Respondent E is a 24-year-old man who currently lives in Durham, North Carolina. He 
considers himself Christian but does not ascribe to a denomination. He does not attend a specific 
church regularly but attends service about four times a year. He identifies as a conservative and 
considers himself an Independent but leans Republican because he agrees with their national 
policies. When asked whether he believes the Republican Party is operating in his best interest, 
Respondent E answered that although he does not support some of what the party stands for, he 
believes that he can get more out of life, in terms of his business and education interests, under 
Republican leadership. However, he does criticize how some of the laws and policies that the 
party supports are outdated. Rather than “serving [mentalities] and beliefs of a few decades ago”, 
policies should be changed with respect to “how life and lifestyles currently are because the 
[Republican] party is still there to represent the people”66. When asked how religion influences 
his political decisions, Respondent E stated that he does not allow differences in religious beliefs 
to sway his political opinions and may even vote against his opinion “for the sake of doing 
something different”67. 
 Respondent F is a 75-year-old woman who currently lives in Durham, North Carolina. 
She is an Episcopal Christian, attends church once a week (and has attended the same church 
since 1967), and reads the Bible daily. She considers herself a conservative Democrat; however, 
she is currently disenchanted with the direction that the party is going and does not see someone 
who could lead the party in the direction she would like to see it go. She wishes the party would 
 
65 Ibid. 




be more inclusive of the three issues she sees as most important: health, education, and the cost 
of a higher education. Despite her religiosity, religion does not play a role in how she votes. 
 Respondent G is a 46-year-old woman who currently lives in Durham, North Carolina. 
She identifies as spiritual and does not read the Bible or attend church services outside of special 
occasions. She considers herself a liberal Democrat. While she is a registered Democrat, she 
does not see herself as connected to the party. Interestingly, Respondent G’s criticism of the 
party almost perfectly reflected the phenomenon of electoral capture. When asked whether she 
feels the Democratic Party is operating in her best interest, she answered68: 
“No, they are the choice we have available. They depend on the Black community 
automatically giving them our vote. They are still just as racist and conformed to 
social structures. They operate on white privilege; they just don't say it like 
another group would… They think since they throw Black communities a bone, 
we're supposed to be thankful for it.” 
She also criticizes both conservatives and liberals as being hypocrites. According to her, 
conservatives claim to abide by Christian and moral values but do not live by them (e.g. calling 
yourself pro-life but going against increases in welfare or healthcare spending). On the other 
hand, liberals claim to be anti-racist but do not do the actual work of living an anti-racist lifestyle 
(e.g. living in gentrified neighborhoods). As someone who is not religious, Respondent G 
expressed that she is sometimes discouraged from voting for candidates who are overtly religious 
and use the Bible to support their political positions. 
 
68 Interview by Cameren Lofton, Durham, North Carolina, February 24, 2020. 
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Respondent H is a 49-year-old man who currently lives in Burlington, North Carolina. He 
is Catholic, attends church almost once a week and reads the Bible daily. He considers himself a 
liberal Democrat and believes that the party is operating in his best interest because they are 
trying to get Donald Trump out of office. Respondent H was the only interviewee to change their 
candidate choice once learning of the candidates’ respective party affiliations. Recall the 
positions of the hypothetical candidates: 
Candidate A: Pro-choice, supports the Affordable Care Act, supports same-sex marriage 
Candidate B: Pro-life, supports Affordable Care Act, supports same-sex marriage 
At first, Respondent H chose Candidate B because of their pro-life position. After 
learning that Candidate B is a Republican and Candidate A is a Democrat, the respondent stated 
that he would like to change his vote choice to Candidate A. When asked what prompted him to 
change his vote choice, he could not give a clear explanation. In response to the question of how 
his religion influences his voting decisions, Respondent H called himself a “modern Christian 
Catholic”69 because he is not as strict on issues such as birth control and abortion and sees his 
political decisions as a product of the values and traditions with which he was raised. 
 On the topic of ideology, the interviews revealed that there is generally some congruence 
between the respondents’ self-proclaimed ideology and their positions on specific policy issues. 
In terms of differences between operational and symbolic ideology, the younger female 
interviewees, Respondents A and B, both considered themselves liberal while two of the older 
male interviewees, Respondents C and D, described themselves as moderate. In terms of their 
operational ideology, both Respondents A and B, who had scores of 2.6470 and 2.93, 
 
69 Interview by Cameren Lofton, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, February 26, 2020. 
70 The measure of operation ideology ranges from 1-3. 
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respectively, were slightly more liberal than Respondents C and D, who had scores of 2.29 and 
2.5, respectively. The most conservative respondent, with a score of 1.62, was Respondent F, an 
older Black woman, while Respondent B, a young Black woman, was the most liberal 
respondent. While Respondent H described himself as a liberal, he scored the lowest of the self-
identified liberals with a score of 2.36.  
 
Table 4: Relationship between Denomination and Adherence to the Prosperity Gospel 
 







Note. N= 8. Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients reported using the “Pearson” function in Excel. For the purpose of the study, 
spirituality is considered distinct from Christianity. 
All the respondents varied in their scores on the Prosperity Index. This index was taken 
from a doctoral thesis on the relationship that the prosperity gospel has with various political and 
social factors71. The Prosperity Index contains 10 questions. Responses were measured on a 
continuous scale from 0-1, in which agreeing with a statement in accordance with the prosperity 
gospel or vice versa would increase one’s score by .1, with 1 being the maximum score that 
someone could earn.  
 
71 Koch, “The Prosperity Gospel and Economic Prosperity”. 
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The mean score on the Prosperity Index for all respondents is .3. Respondent D, who no 
longer attends church, received the lowest score (0) on this index while Respondent A, who 
attends church every week, scored the highest (.63). Respondent C, who is a pastor, was able to 
identify these questions as related to the prosperity gospel with no indication or hints from the 
interviewer. Though he expressed explicit disdain for this theology, he still received a score of .4 
on the index. While the scores between respondents vary, none of the respondents score high on 
the index, indicating that support for this theology is relatively low across the sample. 
Using the Pearson function in Excel, I obtained correlation measures for each of the 
denominations mentioned in the interviews and the respondent’s adherence to the prosperity 
gospel; correlations are reported in Table 4. While all the denominations have relatively weak 
correlations with adherence to the prosperity gospel, spirituality72 has a moderate negative 
correlation. Furthermore, two of the three lowest scores (0 and .2) come from respondents who 
considered themselves spiritual instead of Christian (Respondent D and Respondent G, 
respectively). 
Table 5: Relationships Among Variables Measured in Interviews 
 









Gender 1 -0.129 0.223 0.302 0.111 0.438 
Age -0.129 1 -0.648 -0.402 -0.017 0.356 
Operational 
Ideology 
0.223 -0.648 1 0.853 -0.422 -0.047 
 
72 For the purposes of the interviews, spirituality is considered distinct from Christianity. 
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Symbolic Ideology 0.302 -0.402 0.853 1 -0.127 0.396 
Prosperity Gospel 
Adherence 
0.111 -0.017 -0.422 -0.127 1 0.538 
Party Registration 0.438 0.356 -0.047 0.396 0.538 1 
Note. N=8. Correlation coefficients obtained from the “Pearson” function in Excel. Gender is measured as a dummy variable in 
which Woman=1. Symbolic ideology and operational ideology are both measured on a scale from 1(conservative) to 3(liberal). 
For the “Party Registration” variable, Republican=1, Independent = 2, and Democrat=3. 
Table 5 presents correlation coefficients for other important variables measured in the 
interviews. Though the results of the interviews are not generalizable to the broader public due to 
the small sample size, there are a few trends in the data that are seen among larger samples of 
Black voters and the general public. For instance, there is a strong positive relationship between 
the respondent’s operational and symbolic ideologies, which indicates that the ideological labels 
that the respondents use are fairly consistent with their political beliefs. In contrast, there are 
weak correlations between party registration and both operational and symbolic ideology. This 
relationship is consistent with the finding that among Black voters, ideology and party affiliation 
are not as strongly correlated as in the general public.  
Also consistent with previous findings is the correlation between operational ideology 
and adherence to the prosperity gospel. The prosperity gospel is a conservative theology, which 
is exhibited by the moderate negative correlation between operational ideology and adherence to 
the prosperity gospel. In his interview, Respondent C stated that as one gets older, you become 
more moderate in your political views73, and this statement is reflected in data from the 
interviews: there is a moderate negative correlation between ideology and age.  
 
73 Interview by Cameren Lofton, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, February 7, 2020. 
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Finally, there is a moderate positive correlation between party registration and gender. 
Among the four female respondents, three identified with the Democratic Party and one 
identified as Independent but leaned toward the Democratic Party. Among the four male 
respondents, two identified with the Democratic Party while the other two saw themselves as 
more in line with the Republican Party. Similarly, data from the CCES survey reveals that 
among Black voters, being a woman increases your attachment to the Democratic Party.   
 All interview respondents were asked what role religion plays in their political decisions. 
The responses to this question show that while religion has no influence on the political 
decisions of some, others use their religious beliefs as a guide for their political beliefs. For those 
respondents who did see a connection between their religion and politics, they usually talk about 
broader principles, such as love, rather than specific religious beliefs. Specifically, Respondent C 
identified the communal aspect of religion as important in forming his political decisions. 
Although I cannot draw a direct connection, communalism is an important aspect of Black 
liberation theology. In answering how religion influences politics for Black voters, the interviews 
demonstrate that some respondents make their political decisions with religious beliefs in mind. 
Although the responses to the interview questions vary greatly by respondent, these 
interviews highlight that religion does not bear equal weight on someone’s political 
considerations. While none of the respondents felt that the Democratic Party is operating in their 
best interest, they still saw themselves as connected to the party in some way. Furthermore, 
people of the same denomination may not necessarily resemble each other politically or even in 





 One large limitation in the survey portion of this study is that I was unable to use 
an independent, reliable measure for adherence to the Black liberation theology or the prosperity 
gospel and instead used a proxy measure based on belonging to certain denominations. This 
proxy variable is flawed because belief in and adherence to these theologies can vary greatly 
within one denomination. Furthermore, I do not include a variable for income. Without this 
variable, I am unable to measure whether class affects attachment to the Democratic Party.  
A clear limitation of the interview portion of the thesis is its small sample size. In future 
extensions of this project, I would like to conduct more interviews across a larger geographical 
range. In addition, while the interviews contain a questionnaire to measure one’s adherence to 
the prosperity gospel, I do not have a similar measure for Black liberation theology. In a future 
version of this study, I would construct my own measures of adherence to the prosperity gospel 
and Black liberation theology. 
Conclusion 
This study analyzes the unique role that the church as an institution can play in the 
political decisions of Black voters. As an electorally captured voting bloc, Black voters hold a 
unique position in the Democratic Party. For the past few decades, the party has been able to rely 
on Black voters, but as the party changes and endorses more progressive candidates and their 
policies, it may also alienate some of those voters who have consistently voted for the party, 
namely Black conservatives. Several scholars have analyzed what factors can disrupt the 
phenomenon of electoral capture among Black voters and pull Black voters away from the 
Democratic Party. They find that group consciousness plays an important role in determining 
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attachment to the Democratic Party among Black conservatives. With my study, I show that 
certain theologies popular in Black churches can also influence one’s attachment to the 
Democratic Party.  
By analyzing Black liberation theology and the prosperity gospel, I was able to examine 
how theologies that encourage communalism and individualism, respectively, influence 
attachment to the Democratic Party. I found that regardless of ideology, adhering to Black 
liberation theology predicts a stronger attachment to the Democratic Party. Among 
conservatives, adherence to the prosperity gospel predicts a weaker attachment to the Democratic 
Party. Furthermore, women have stronger attachments to the Democratic Party than men and this 
trend is stronger among conservatives. A positive significant relationship between Black 
liberation theology and attachment to the Democratic Party was only observed among all 
respondents and non-conservatives while the negative significant relationship between the 
prosperity gospel and Democratic Party attachment was only observed among conservatives.  
In addition, the interviews replicated the finding that women have stronger attachments to 
the Democratic Party. They also showed that although religion can influence the political 
decisions of Black voters, the relationship between religion and politics still varies greatly 
between voters. The results of the quantitative portion of the study support my first and second 
hypothesis, but the hypotheses are not true for all ideological groups. The hypothesized effect of 
Black liberation theology on attachment to the Democratic Party is not observed among Black 
conservatives. Similarly, the hypothesized effect of the prosperity gospel on attachment to the 




 This study presents important information on the topic of the intersection of religion and 
politics among Black voters and shows that Black voters are not monolithic in their voting 
patterns or ideologies. Moreover, the results from both portions of the study highlight the 
important role that Black women play in the Democratic Party. Their attachment to the party is 
consistently stronger than their male counterparts, especially among Black conservatives.  
The results of this study have implications for how Black voter engagement with the 
Democratic Party may change in the future. While a weaker attachment to the Democratic Party 
may not mean that the Democratic Party will completely lose the Black vote, it could result in 
less effortful activism and lower turnout in local and state elections. This study does show that 
certain factors can weaken the historical attachment between Black voters and the Democratic 
Party, but this does not mean that Black voters are switching to the Republican Party. Rather, the 
two parties may find themselves in competition over the Black vote as some Black voters see 




















Table 1: Theology x Party Attachment: Marginal Probabilities 












































































Note. N= 7664. There are 509 Black liberation theology adherents. Black liberation theology adherents are identified by the 
following denominations: National Baptist Convention, African Methodist Episcopal Church, and Church of God in Christ. There 






Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
Gender 7,926 0.648 0.478 0 0 1 1 
Education 7,926 2.541 1.357 0 1 4 5 
Party Identification 7,664 0.818 0.242 0.000 0.667 1.000 1.000 
Ideology 7,122 3.246 1.009 1.000 3.000 4.000 5.000 
Pres. Vote 3,978 0.932 0.251 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
State Senate Vote 3,499 0.925 0.264 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
State Leg. Vote 3,505 0.924 0.264 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Church Attendance 7,789 2.473 1.697 0.000 1.000 4.000 5.000 
Gay Marriage 7,849 0.419 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Repeal ACA 7,913 0.343 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Taxes 3,781 0.527 0.239 0.000 0.400 0.690 1.000 
Party Attachment 7,664 0.818 0.242 0.000 0.667 1.000 1.000 
Operational Ideology 3,734 1.244 0.800 0.000 0.500 1.737 3.000 
Black Liberation Theology 7,926 0.066 0.248 0 0 0 1 
Prosperity Gospel 7,926 0.051 0.220 0 0 0 1 
  
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics- Conservatives 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
Gender 1,425 0.648 0.478 0 0 1 1 
Education 1,425 2.409 1.318 0 1 4 5 
Party Identification 1,393 0.749 0.330 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000 
Ideology 1,425 1.739 0.439 1 1 2 2 
Pres. Vote 648 0.793 0.405 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
State Senate Vote 583 0.787 0.410 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
State Leg. Vote 581 0.783 0.412 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Church Attendance 1,409 3.050 1.634 0.000 2.000 4.000 5.000 
Gay Marriage 1,414 0.622 0.485 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Repeal ACA 1,422 0.528 0.499 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Taxes 663 0.589 0.247 0.000 0.490 0.770 1.000 
Party Attachment 1,393 0.749 0.330 0.000 0.500 1.000 1.000 
Operational Ideology 655 1.795 0.792 0.000 1.395 2.510 3.000 
Black Liberation Theology 1,425 0.062 0.242 0 0 0 1 
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Prosperity Gospel 1,425 0.069 0.253 0 0 0 1 
 
Table 4: Summary Statistics- Non-Conservatives 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max 
Gender 5,697 0.635 0.481 0 0 1 1 
Education 5,697 2.658 1.357 0 2 4 5 
Party Identification 5,607 0.842 0.212 0.000 0.667 1.000 1.000 
Ideology 5,697 3.623 0.717 3 3 4 5 
Pres. Vote 3,115 0.959 0.199 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
State Senate Vote 2,735 0.951 0.216 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
State Leg. Vote 2,744 0.953 0.212 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Church Attendance 5,621 2.359 1.680 0.000 1.000 4.000 5.000 
Gay Marriage 5,642 0.363 0.481 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Repeal ACA 5,688 0.285 0.452 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Taxes 2,904 0.511 0.235 0.000 0.380 0.640 1.000 
Party Attachment 5,607 0.842 0.212 0.000 0.667 1.000 1.000 
Operational Ideology 2,869 1.102 0.747 0.000 0.500 1.560 3.000 
Black Liberation Theology 5,697 0.072 0.258 0 0 0 1 
Prosperity Gospel 5,697 0.047 0.212 0 0 0 1 
 
 
Table 5: Theology x Party Attachment: All Black Respondents 
 Party Attachment 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Black Liberation Theology (0-1) 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Prosperity Gospel (0-1) -0.005 -0.009 -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Female = 1  0.053*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Church Attendance   0.002 0.002 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Education    -0.001 
    (0.002) 
Intercept 0.815*** 0.781*** 0.777*** 0.779*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
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N 7664 7664 7545 7545 
R-squared 0.003 0.014 0.014 0.014 
Adj. R-squared 0.003 0.014 0.014 0.014 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
 
 
Table 6: Theology x Party Attachment: Black Conservatives 
 Party Attachment 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Black Liberation Theology (0-1) 0.020 0.017 0.018 0.022 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
Prosperity Gospel (0-1) -0.048 -0.066* -0.065* -0.064* 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Female = 1  0.126*** 0.126*** 0.125*** 
  (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Church Attendance   -0.001 0.002 
   (0.006) (0.006) 
Education    -0.023*** 
    (0.007) 
Intercept 0.751*** 0.671*** 0.673*** 0.720*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.021) (0.025) 
N 1393 1393 1379 1379 
R-squared 0.002 0.035 0.035 0.043 
Adj. R-squared 0.0002 0.032 0.032 0.039 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
 
Table 7: Theology x Party Attachment: Black Non-Conservatives 
 Party Attachment 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Black Liberation Theology (0-1) 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Prosperity Gospel (0-1) 0.021 0.019 0.011 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Female = 1  0.045*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
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Church Attendance   0.006*** 0.006*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Education    0.001 
    (0.002) 
Intercept 0.837*** 0.809*** 0.797*** 0.795*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
N 5607 5607 5535 5535 
R-squared 0.004 0.015 0.017 0.017 
Adj. R-squared 0.004 0.014 0.016 0.016 
***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1 
 
Figure 1: Gender, Black Liberation Theology Adherence, and Party Attachment 
 





Figure 3: Gender, Prosperity Gospel Adherence, and Party Attachment (Conservatives) 
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